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EU Solidarity and Policy in Fighting Infectious 
Diseases: State of Play, Obstacles, Citizen 
Preferences and Ways Forward. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we confront the role the EU traditionally plays in the domain of health with the urgent 
need for collective action triggered by the corona virus pandemic. In the face of such a crisis, we 
argue that the joint procurement, stockpiling and allocation of medical countermeasures is a key 
component of true European solidarity, besides maintaining the integrity of the Single Market. 
We present the first results of a survey experiment taken before the current crisis on citizens’ 
attitudes towards centralizing at the EU level of policies to combat infectious diseases, which 
indicates considerable support. We conclude that a more robust policy framework with substantial 
centralization of procurement, stockpiling and allocation is warranted. 
JEL-Codes: I100, I180. 
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Since a few weeks the world has been in the throes of the outbreak of COVID-19. At the 
moment of writing, there have been over 950,000 confirmed cases and almost 50,000 deaths 
worldwide. Healthcare systems are completely overburdened, while the economic 
implications are devastating. Vaccines are the number one counter measure to stop this and 
future pandemic outbreaks and save human life. And yet, the development and dissemination 
of just such vaccines and medical countermeasures generally are where the political fights can 
be fiercest. The US government tried to secure rights and access to EU-based vaccine 
developers through its legal, political and financial power – flouting global solidarity 
regarding access to counter measures against the COVID-19 outbreak. Among other moves, it 
has reportedly sought to buy one of the companies based in Germany that has been building a 
vaccine dossier expected to be centrally authorized in June or July of this year. Apparently, 
Germany has prevented the completion of this sale and its government is now working with 
the EU to come up with a more general strategy and solution to address this kind of challenge, 
and to promote more solidarity in the pooling of resources and risk.  This incident might not 
be the last attempt, by the US or any other country or party, to go it alone and thus disregard 
the need for global solidarity. In a broader sense, organizing societal solidarity is also a 
counter-measure against the wider implications of a serious disease outbreak, for instance in 
economic terms. However, this paper focuses on  narrower aspect of solidarity: within the 
domain of healthcare, what are the best policy options for organizing EU solidarity with 
regard to medicinal counter-measures to infectious diseases?  
 
This paper addresses this question on the backdrop of a legal and economic policy analysis, 
informed research on public attitudes. We first discuss what ‘EU health solidarity’ means. 
Solidarity is a well-known organizing principle in national health care systems, guiding the 
distribution and rationalization of the public goods involved in this domain. This principle is 
also recognized in the EU’s legal constellation, although there has always been a tension 
between this domestic solidarity principle and the EU’s internal market principles. Second, we 
outline the manner in which the EU promises to organize collective action based on true 
European solidarity to address pandemics. This promise could have come from the Treaty 
changes with the Lisbon amendments and new regulation adopted after the 2009 Swine Flu 
outbreak; nevertheless, the EU’s competences in health remain relatively limited, and even 
after the Swine Flu the way forward proved to be difficult, given significant hesitations in 
Member States. Third, we empirically report results from a survey experiment among a 
representative sample of 400 Dutch citizens (yielding 2400 judged policy packages) surveyed 
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before the outbreak of the current crisis. The experiment explores what the EU role should be 
with respect to organizing solidarity regarding access to pandemic medicines.  
 
The conclusions emerging from these three steps are clear: there are good social, economic 
and legal arguments, and likely also meaningful public support for procuring, stockpiling and 
allocating medical counter measures to COVID-19 and other infectious diseases at the EU 
level. This eliminates the inefficiency associated with excess demand and excess supply co-
existing in various parts of the EU. More importantly, it allows massive firepower to be 
instantly targeted to wherever an outbreak starts. And if well-organized ex ante, it secures 
credible commitments by all Member States to the cooperation that is needed ex post, when a 
crisis hits.  
 
1. Solidarity 
1.1 Solidarity in public health and health care 
Health policy and law pertains to that area of our life where we face shared risks and 
opportunities related to life, disease and mortality.7 Solidarity in health is generally linked to a 
sense of commitment to help those in need, even if we do not know exactly whom we are 
helping. The donation of blood in this regard is often cited as how – in the context of shared 
risks and human suffering – solidarity is a driving force for societal organization.8 Particularly 
when there is an emergency, people are keen to help out and solidarity is widely seen as more 
acceptable than self-help.9  
 
Solidarity in health is multifaceted. In bioethics, solidarity has a long history;10 it has been 
used particularly in the context of public health (as opposed to health care/medical care) to 
justify state interferences such as quarantines or mandatory medical examinations and 
vaccinations, i.e. the enforcement by public authorities of necessary collective action, which 
                                                      
7 Anniek de Ruijter, EU Health Law & Policy: The Expansion of EU Power in Public Health and Health Care 
(Oxford University Press 2019). Anniek de Ruijter, ‘The Impediment of Health Laws’ Values in the 
Constitutional Setting of the EU’ in TK Hervey, Calum Alasdair Young and Louise Bishop (eds), Research 
Handbook on EU Health Law and Policy (Edward Elgar 2017). Tamara K Hervey and Jean V McHale, 
European Union Health Law: Themes and Implications (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
8 ‘Implicit solidarity’: Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell, Tissue Economies: Blood, Organs, and Cell Lines 
in Late Capitalism (Duke University Press 2006) 3 and 128. And see Titmuss Richard, The Gift Relationship 
(Reissue): From Human Blood to Social Policy (Policy Press 2018). A.M. Farrell, ‘Is the Gift Still Good? 
Examining the Politics and Regulation of Blood Safety in the European Union’ (2006) 14 Medical Law Review 
155. 
9 Philipp Genschel and Anton Hemerijck, ‘Solidarity in Europe’ (2018) 01 EUI Policy Brief. 
10  Rob Houtepen and Ruud ter Meulen, ‘New Types of Solidarity in the European Welfare State’ (2000) 8 
Health Care Analysis 329. 
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can be understood as a demand of solidarity.11 When it comes to resource allocation for 
access to medical care and medicines, solidarity also forms a key principle and value: here, it 
justifies mechanisms of insurance, redistribution, planning and rationing, to ensure access to 
medicines and services that are needed to promote and protect human health as part of the 
welfare system.12 The implementation of this notion of solidarity in the organization of public 
health and health care systems is key to ensure equal access to medical and preventive care, as 
well as ‘universal access’, in all EU Member States.13  
 
Universal access means that each citizen is granted equal access to a specific basket of care 
and medicines. Solidarity in ensuring universal access to health care and medicines always 
entails rationing access.  In most Member States this means that the basket of care is limited 
and a matter of political choices; and for such choices democratic legitimacy is key. In public 
health this can entail limited access to preventive public care, such as age limits for certain 
prevention programmes for cancer. In health care this might mean that certain experimental 
treatments or alternative treatments are not part of the (social) insurance and benefits package. 
But it can also entail rationing care through networks, where choice and access to particular 
health care providers is limited. In other Member States universal access is achieved, e.g. 
through a ‘budget model’ in that health care is only provided within the constraints of limited 
budgets and inevitable waiting lists. Particularly also with regard to medicines, national 
choices on how to ensure health solidarity through rationing are a matter of intricate health 
insurance systems, politics, economics and bioethics.14 
 
                                                      
11 There is some discussion as to the explanatory weight of solidarity in state level arrengements for sharing the 
burdens of a large scale disease outbreak, see Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, Solidarity: Reflections on an 
Emerging Concept in Bioethics (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2011); Angus Dawson and Marcel Verweij, 
‘Solidarity: A Moral Concept in Need of Clarification’ (2012) 5 Public Health Ethics 1; Barbara Prainsack and 
Alena Buyx, ‘Understanding Solidarity (With a Little Help from Your Friends) Response to Dawson and 
Verweij’ (2012) 5 Public Health Ethics 206. But for its uses in interstate relations this discussion carries less 
weight – see Lawrence O Gostin, Lindsay F Wiley and Thomas R Frieden, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, 
Restraint (3 edition, University of California Press 2016); Howard Brody and Eric N Avery, ‘Medicine’s Duty to 
Treat Pandemic Illness: Solidarity and Vulnerability’ (2009) 39 Hastings Center Report 40. And also see 
Prainsack and Buyx (2011), Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics. 
12 Barbara Prainsack and Alena Buyx, Solidarity in Biomedicine and Beyond (Cambridge University Press 2017) 
7; N Daniels, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly (Cambridge University Press 2008); Chris James and 
William Savedoff, ‘Risk Pooling and Redistribution in Health Care: An Emperical Analysis of Attitudes toward 
Solidarity’ [2010] World Health Report (2010) Background paper No. 5  
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/96a4/6bd3f42ef4530bf6ab1e094bc9709a2e6a83.pdf>. 
13 De Ruijter (n 7). 
14 WHO Europe, ‘Strengthening Member State Collaboration on Improving Access to Medicines in the WHO 
European Region, EUR/RC67/11 67th Session Budapest, Hungary, 11 -14 September 2017’. 
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Indeed, while solidarity in the face of health risks is a shared EU value and principle, the 
reality of access to health care and public health protections on the ground in the Member 
States is very different. Out-of-pocket costs in Eastern European Countries and Greece vary 
from 23 to almost 50% of payments, going down to 12 to 15% in Western and Scandinavian 
EU Member States.15 These health-system and public-health divergences between Member 
States are well-documented, and solidarity in this regard is organized largely at the Member 
State level. Medicines make up about 25 percent on average of national budgets for health 
care.16 However, access to medicines is very different across EU Member States.17 
 
1.2 EU solidarity in health 
 
Despite these national differences, solidarity is recognized throughout the EU law and policy. 
Article 2 of the TFEU outlines: 
 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.  
 
Furthermore, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) enshrines 
the values of solidarity and equality in welfare and health settings.18  
                                                      
15 See for a quick overview the Country Health Profiles of the European Commission: 
https://ec.europa.eu/health/state/country_profiles_en. Also see Eurostat, Health in the European Union – facts 
and figures https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Health_in_the_European_Union_%E2%80%93_facts_and_figures. 
16 OECD, ‘Pharmaceutical spending (2018)’ at <https://data.oecd.org/healthres/pharmaceutical-spending.htm>.  
17 See ‘Council Conclusions on Strengthening the Balance in the Pharmaceutical Systems in the EU and Its 
Member States (17 June 2016)’. Also, see Department of Health, The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, 
Eleventh Report to Parliament, February 2012, available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/215156/dh_132793.pdf>  
18 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391. 
Value Context Article Application 
Equality, solidarity 
and universal 
access 
Non-discrimination 20-26 CFREU Non-discrimination in access to health 
care services and preventive care 
Equality, solidarity Employment 32 CFREU Occupational health  
employment as a social 
determinant 
Solidarity and 
Equality 
Social security 33 CFREU Social security as a social determinant of 
public health 
Equality, universal 
access 
Right to health 
Right to access health 
care 
35 CFREU Access to health care and other (public) 
health services.  
Access to preventive care 
Protection of public health  
Reproductive Health 
Protection of environment as it affects 
public health 
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Solidarity in access to health and medicines is also at the EU level explicitly recognized as a 
key value to be guaranteed in EU policy and law. In 2006, in the context of legislative 
discussions in the adoption of the Patient’s Rights Directive,19 Member States formulated in 
the Council Conclusions that solidarity through universal access was to be adhered to by the 
Union and in the Member States.20 These common values and principles of health systems are 
not intended to refer to legal principles (that have the status of primary law in the EU). 
However, the document does represent a European baseline for health law that is common to 
the Member States.  
 
In sum, solidarity in ensuring access to health and medicines is a key organizing principle for 
EU health policy, economics and law. This solidarity typically is understood as playing out at 
the domestic, national level. However, solidarity pertains not only to redistribution and risk 
pooling within Member States, but also between Member States and in external relations of 
the EU.21 For sure, despite the many references to ‘solidarity’ in official European 
declarations and documents, what ‘solidarity’ as an overarching concept exactly means for the 
EU as a polity remains somewhat elusive and is the subject matter of much scholarly debate.22 
Yet, in the case of disasters, such as a pandemic, the European Treaties set out a clear 
mandate, at least in principle, in Article 222 TFEU. This article, introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty of 2007, stipulates that solidarity demands that in case of a natural or manmade 
disaster Member States provide assistance to one another and act jointly and in cooperation.23 
On this basis, the related Civil Protection Mechanism has been activated in the context of 
                                                      
19 Directive 2011/24/EU, ‘Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 
on the Application of Patients’ Rights in Cross-Border Healthcare (O.J. L88/45, 4-4-2011)’. 
20 Council Conclusions, ‘Council Conclusions on Common Values and Principles in European Union Health 
Systems (2006/C 146/01) (O.J. 146/1)’  
21 See Articles 21, 24(3), 31 and 32 TEU and see articles 80, 122 and 222 TFEU.{Citation} 
22 For a recent overview of the variegated understandings of ‘solidarity’ in the EU, see R. Coman, L. Fromont, 
A. Weyembergh (dir.), Les solidarités européennes, Entre enjeux, tensions et reconfiguration. Bruylant, 2019. 
For a review of different normative accounts of the role the EU should play in the realm of insurance and 
redistribution, as key dimensions of welfare state solidarity, see Frank Vandenbroucke, ‘Solidarity through 
Redistribution and Insurance of Incomes: The EU as Support, Guide, Guarantor or Provider?’ Amsterdam Centre 
for European Studies Research Paper, January 2020. 
23 ‘Council Decision of 24 June 2014 on the Arrangements for the Implementation by the Union of the Solidarity 
Clause (2014/415/EU) OJ L 192/53’. 
Occupational health 
Regulation of services of general 
interests 
Pharmaceuticals and medical devices 
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COVID-19. For health it works in close relation with the Health Security Mechanisms and it 
pools Member State resources for instance in the organization of a European Medical Corps.24  
 
Simultaneously, there has always been a tension between the domestic principles of solidarity 
and the principles of market integration that underpin the Single Market. In the application of 
the internal market rules, any national health laws that created a barrier to the free movement 
of goods or services were suspect and needed to be justified as a valid exception to the free 
movement principle. In fact, some of the important ‘constitutional moments’ for the creation 
of the European internal market revolved around health exceptions to the free movement of 
goods (Arts 34 TFEU – ban on import barriers, 35 TFEU – ban on expert barriers, and 36 
TFEU – exceptions). The European Court in the case Cassis de Dijon (1978) created an 
exception to Member States’ barriers to free movement, as the reference to public health 
concerns was seen, in this case, as a disguise for economic protectionism.25 And in the famous 
case of Tobacco Advertising (1998), the Court outlined the limitations on the EU in adopting 
measures outside of its legal competences.26 Drawing and re-drawing the thin line between 
‘national solidarity’ and ‘national public health’ demand, on one hand, and the principles of 
market integration and free movement, on the other hand, has been the subject of much of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’s activity and case law. It is no surprise that, 
from the perspective of the national health care authorities, the EU’s most salient role was 
often seen as hinging upon policies of deregulation.  
 
At the same time, as the Tobacco Advertising case indicates, the removal of national health 
laws as barriers to the single market is not the only aspect to the role of the EU in health. The 
tobacco advertising regulation was a central part of the EU’s cancer prevention programme 
that is built on regulation of advertising, the modalities of tobacco sale and research and 
                                                      
24 Joana M Haussig and others, ‘The European Medical Corps: First Public Health Team Mission and Future 
Perspectives’ (2017) 22 Eurosurveillance; ‘European Commission Press Release: EU Launches New European 
Medical Corps to Respond Faster to Emergencies (MEMO/16/276)’. 
25 ‘Cassis’ provides the principles of mutual recognition and a softening of the Dassonville case law where all 
Member States’ regulation could be considered barriers to trade. Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville 
[1974] ECR 837. In ‘Cassis’ the Court holds that Member States must allow a good that is lawfully marketed in 
another Member State, unless mandatory requirements for reasons of public health would provide a legitimate 
‘rule of reason’. Interestingly, Article 36 TFEU already provides for a public health exception. Case 120/78, 
Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopoverwaltung fur Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
26 The Court in this case determines that no regulation can be created by the European legislator that has health 
protection as a central and single objective. There has to be a link with internal market objectives. Case C-
376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) [2000] ECR I-8419. 
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public health programmes into cancer prevention.27 Similarly the EU has had a central role for 
the regulation of health and safety of the EU products market, medical devices, 
pharmaceuticals, the recognition and quality of medical professionals and workplace safety. 28 
And, already since the 1970s, the EU is growing its capacity and role in the surveillance and 
early warning of public health threats, first of all with the development and use of European 
(disease) networks of EU-supported public health experts and epidemiologists.29 However, all 
this did not carve out a strong role for the EU in organizing solidarity for health, involving 
redistribution or rationing.  
 
Overall, the difficulty in separating health and the internal market is clearly apparent, but the 
division remains and is reiterated with each Treaty amendment. In fact, although health is 
mentioned throughout the Treaty as an exception to the free market principles and as a 
general EU goal, Article 168 TFEU, which outlines the EU’s role and responsibility in health, 
simultaneously reinforces the premise that the EU does not have the power to create health 
law outside of specifically outlined situations.30 EU scrutiny of national public health laws is 
highly developed in EU case law, particularly as it comes to the free movement of goods. 
This is a relevant legal backdrop for the organization of solidarity via the public procurement 
of vaccines at EU level that followed after the Swine Flu outbreak, which we discuss in the 
next section. 
 
2. EU health solidarity in the face of danger 
 
                                                      
27 L Trubek, M Nance and T Hervey, ‘The Construction of a Healthier Europe: Lessons from the Fight Against 
Cancer’ (2008) 26 Wisconsin International Law Journal; ‘A Programme of Action of the European Community 
Against Cancer  (O.J. C184, 23-07-1986)’; ‘Decision 88/351/EEC Europe Against Cancer Programme of the 
Council and Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council (O.J. 
L160/52 1988)’. 
28 E Vos, Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and Safety Regulation: Committees, Agencies and 
Private Bodies (Hart Publishing 1999); R Hamalainen, The Europeanisation of Occupational Health Services: A 
Study of the Impact of EU Policies, vol 82 (Juvenes 2008); D Gagliardi and others, ‘Occupational Safety and 
Health in Europe: Lessons from the Past, Challenges and Opportunities for the Future’ (2012) 50 Industrial 
Health 7. 
29 De Ruijter (n 7) 121 et seq. 
30 This restriction holds both for public health and access to health care. Art. 168 (5) stipulates that “measures 
designed to protect and improve human health and in particular to combat the major cross-border health 
scourges, measures concerning monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to 
health, and measures which have as their direct objective the protection of public health regarding tobacco and 
the abuse of alcohol” exclude “any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.”.  Art. 
168(7) makes clear that “Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of 
their health policy and for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care. The responsibilities 
of the Member States shall include the management of health services and medical care and the allocation of the 
resources assigned to them.” 
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2.1. Limited EU competences in health, even after Swine Flu 
In order to understand the current role the EU can have with respect to organizing solidarity 
for responding to COVID-19, particularly with regard to the public procurement of pandemic 
medicines and medical counter measures more generally, we should return to April 2009 with 
the global spread of a new virus, the Swine Flu. The virus originated in pigs from Asia that 
were transported to North America. The global health community was on high alert: in the 
case of the 2003 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in Asia, 774 of the 8096 people 
infected died.31 This virus did not spread very easily or quickly, but it had a high mortality 
rate (about 10 percent). By comparison, the Spanish Flu of 1918-1919 killed millions, but had 
an actual mortality rate of 2.5 percent.32  
 
There was a fear that the Swine Flu (influenza AH1N1) would have a mortality rate that was 
comparable to the Bird Flu, influenza AH5N1 (over 60 percent) and would spread more 
easily.33 In June 2009 the WHO declared that there was a pandemic spread of Swine Flu and 
raised the threat level to phase 6 (the WHO’s highest categorization of spread for 
pandemics).34 Luckily the Swine Flu turned out to be no more deadly than a seasonal flu. But 
the difficult choices that we are now facing with regard the organization and the acceptability 
of EU solidarity regarding the COVID-19 outbreak in Europe already came to the fore in full 
force with the 2009 Swine Flu. And that experience has led to at least some of the elements in 
the EU policy landscape within which we now find ourselves. 
 
In the year of the Swine Flu outbreak, new provisions in the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007 – 
immediately after the earlier scares of Anthrax, SARS and Bird flu – created the basis for the 
current EU role, by adding to Article 168 TFEU:  
 
Union action, which shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards improving public 
health, […]. Such action shall cover the fight against major health scourges, by promoting research into 
                                                      
31 See WHO Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): 
Status of the Outbreak and Lessons for the immediate future, 20 May 2003 at p. 3; also see WHO, Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) - multi-country outbreak – Update 6 March 2003. 
32 See, https://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/avian_influenza/h5n1_research/faqs/en/ 
Also see V.Wiwanitkit Bird Flu: The New Emerging Infectious Disease (Nova Science Publishers, New York: 
2008) at p.2. 
33 J.H. Beigel et al 'Avian influenza A (H5N1) infection in humans' (2005) New England Journal of Medicine 
353 (13) 1347-1385. 
34 ‘World Now at the Start of 2009 Influenza Pandemic Dr Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World Health 
Organization, Statement to the Press by WHO Director-General Dr Margaret Chan (11 June 2009) 
https://Www.Who.Int/Mediacentre/News/Statements/2009/H1n1_pandemic_phase6_20090611/En/’. 
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their courses, their transmission and their prevention, as well as health information and education, and 
monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health. […] 
 
With respect to EU regulation, at the time of the 2009 Swine Flu outbreak, no secondary 
legislation had been adopted on the basis of this added paragraph in Article 168 TFEU. 
However, a major problem arose with respect to the availably of pandemic vaccines and 
antivirals. The Commission had been trying for years to create a stockpile of antivirals. 
Nevertheless, this was deemed unacceptable by the Member States that wanted to keep the 
ability to procure medication at Member State level: Although the approval process of 
medicines is highly integrated at the EU level, the actual procurement of medicines is still a 
firm competence of the Member States. The procurement is the most costly aspect of ensuring 
access to pandemic medicines, given that the average cost is between 5 and 10 euros per dose 
per person.35 Lack of transparency adds to these problems; often it is simply not possible to 
access information on development and acquisition costs, as this is part of the procurement 
contracts between industry and the EU Member States.36 
 
After the outbreaks of Bird Flu (avian influenza) and SARS, the Member States had made 
pre-purchase agreements with the pharmaceutical industry. This meant in many cases that as 
soon as the WHO declared a public health emergency of international concern, these pre-
purchase agreements were activated and Member States had to accept the volume and price 
that was initially agreed.37 In some cases this meant that vaccines and antivirals did not go to 
the countries in the EU that needed them most, and the price was often above-and-beyond 
reasonable. 38  At the time the EU created in an ad-hoc fashion a voluntary public procurement 
system, whereby Member States that did not have access to the vaccine anymore could still 
get access, and a stockpile was created where Member States that had too many vaccines that 
could be offloaded. 39 
 
As one EU civil servant summarized the situation in 2010:  
                                                      
35 This is and estimated guess based on media reporting and the costs of seasonal vaccinations. 
36 These rules also apply to EU Public procurement Article 339 of the Treaty on the obligation of professional 
secrecy; Article 155(3) of the Rules of Application on the secrecy of tenders. 
37 Mark Turner, ‘Vaccine Procurement during an Influenza Pandemic and the Role of Advance Purchase 
Agreements: Lessons from 2009-H1N1’ (2016) 11 Global Public Health 322. 
38 European Medicines Agency, ‘European Medicines Agency, Pandemic Report and Lessons Learned Outcome 
of the European Medicines Agency’s Activities during the 2009 (H1N1) Flu Pandemic (29 April 2011), 
Available at: Http://Www.Ema.Europa.Eu/Docs/En_GB/Document_library/Report/2011/04/WC500105820.Pdf 
(Last Accessed March 2014)’; Mark Turner, ‘Vaccine Procurement during an Influenza Pandemic and the Role 
of Advance Purchase Agreements: Lessons from 2009-H1N1’ (2016) 11 Global Public Health 322. 
39 Ibid. For a case study on the regulatory changes as a result of  Influenza A H1N1, see de Ruijter (n 7). 
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We discussed the EU stockpile of antivirals until we were all exhausted and then decided that there was 
no agreement. And when the pandemic happened, they [MS] suddenly found themselves in the situation 
that some countries had far too much and some countries had none. And there was no way to deal with 
this in the middle of the crisis so we needed to (…) develop sufficiently good arguments in advance that 
convinces people to adopt the measures in good time rather than afterwards  
 
A Member State health representative clarified the situation in the same year (2010):  
We [the Member States] have been trying since 2005 to come to a mechanism for joint procurement. It 
took the pandemic to find an agreement […]. So, in a sense it will always be crisis driven, like lot of 
policies are […]40  
 
 
2.2. Public procurement: only voluntary, not mandatory 
After intensive evaluations in 2010,41 in December 2011 the Commission proposed a new 
decision on all serious cross-border health threats in order to address some of the problems 
identified above.42 This proposal was adopted in 2013.43 Again, however, Member States did 
not agree to a binding system for public procurement. Instead Article 5 of Decision 
No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council created the legal basis for a 
voluntary public procurement medical countermeasure in case of a health emergency,44 that is 
either declared and identified by the WHO or by the European Commission.45 The Joint 
Procurement Agreement that further implements Article 5 entered into force in June 2014.46 
This agreement applies to joint procurement of medicines (antivirals, treatments or vaccines), 
medical devices (infusion pumps, needles) and ‘other services and goods’ needed to mitigate 
or treat cross-border threats to health, such as laboratory tests, diagnostic tools, 
decontamination products, masks or personal protective equipment.47  
 
The procedure per procurement is agreed among the contracting parties (Member States that 
decide to join, the European Commission). Among other elements, it has to meet the 
conditions that it does not affect the internal market, does not constitute discrimination or a 
                                                      
40 Both quoted in de ibid.p.138. 
41 European Commission, ‘Commission staff working document on lessons learnt from the H1N1 pandemic and 
on health security in the European Union’, Brussels SEC(2010) 1440 final, 18 November 2010, p.3.  
42 Commission proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on serious cross-border 
threats to health Brussels (COM(2011)866 final). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Art. 1 JPA; European Commission, Health and Consumers Directorate-General, ‘Explanatory note: on the 
Joint Procurement Mechanism’, Luxembourg, December 2015, available at: < 
https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/preparedness_response/docs/jpa_explanatory_en.pdf> p.9.  
45 Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on serious 
cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 2119/98/EC [2013] OJ L 293/1.  
46 European Commission, ‘Joint Procurement Agreement to Procure Medical Countermeasures’.  
47 European Commission, Health and Consumers Directorate-General, ‘Medical countermeasures that could be 
procured in common under the Joint Procurement Agreement’, Luxembourg, December 2014, SANCO C3, 
available at: < https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/preparedness_response/docs/jpa_note_scope_en.pdf>. 
 
 
12
restriction of trade and does not cause distortion of competition; and that it does not have any 
direct financial impact on the budget of Member States not participating in the joint 
procurement.48 The European Commission and the participating Member States should agree 
in particular upon the detailed practical arrangements for the evaluation of the requests for 
participation or of the tenders, the award of the contract, the law applicable to the contract and 
the competent court for hearing disputes.49 Importantly, Member States with each tender need 
to decide on the criteria governing the allocation of the available amounts of medical 
countermeasures among the participating Member States. In principle, Member States should 
receive the exact amount of countermeasures that they have ordered, but the rate of delivery 
may be slower in accordance with the allocation criteria.50  
 
In urgent situations, Member States may request derogation from these generally applicable 
allocation criteria.51 This means that participating Member States in need may receive the 
medical countermeasures at a faster rate than other participating Member States. Furthermore, 
the agreement allows Member States to donate medical countermeasures acquired under the 
joint procurement procedure.52 This ‘urgency’ or need would be decided on by the 
Commission and the Member States that joined in the Joint Procurement Agreement Steering 
Committee on the basis of the choices that are made in advance as part of the procurement 
procedure. Each procedure sets its own conditions and distributive regulations.53 
 
In March 2019, the European Commission and 15 Member States, representing about half of 
the European population,54 signed framework contracts for the joint procurement of pandemic 
influenza vaccines with pharmaceutical company Seqirus. Furthermore, Member States are 
currently preparing joint procurement procedures for diphtheria anti-toxin, Tuberculin, BCG 
vaccines and Personal Protective Equipment.55 
 
                                                      
48Article 5(3) Decision No. 1082/2013/EU. 
49 Ibid, And see Art. 165(2) Financial Regulation. 
50 Art. 17(1) JPA.  
51 Art. 17(2) JPA. 
52 Art. 31 JPA. 
53 Art. 17 JPA 
54 Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
55 ‘MEMO28/03/2019 Framework Contracts for Pandemic Influenza Vaccines’  
https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/preparedness_response/docs/ev_20190328_memo_en.pdf. 
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The EU can play an important role for COVID-19 in organising health solidarity through a 
European Public Procurement process. In comparison to the Swine Flu outbreak, which was a 
low example of EU solidarity, the current system already has created a centralising effect in 
the pre-purchase that was done with 15 Member States in 2019,56 and currently more of these 
processes are on the way.57 In the context of the Health Security Committee, where the 
Member States at the level of the health ministries are in close contact during health 
emergencies, the Commission has indicated that new initiatives are proposed in this context, 
including joint procurements on eye protection and respirators, and ventilators. At the same 
time the EMA together with the Commission is investigating the availability of 
investigational therapeutics.58  
 
Public procurement under ‘rescEU’ 
Another route for a more central role for the EU could be under the heading of EU solidarity 
proper, rather than in the context of the EU health law regime. Article 222 TFEU mandates 
that in disasters Member States provide mutual assistance and act in cooperation. However, 
such cooperation is voluntary.59 The EU Civil Protection Mechanism established on the basis 
of Article 222 TFEU, depends on the willingness of Member States to join forces. In 2019 the 
Civil Protection Mechanism was strengthened by ‘rescEU’, in an attempt to centralize EU 
capacities.60 Article 12 of this Decision provides for the EU to use its internal funds, pre-
committed national funds and EU co-financed Member States capacities at the disposal of EU 
efforts, to respond to a major emergency.  
 
Importantly, this mechanism also creates the possibility for joint procurement, operating in 
parallel to the Joint Procurement Agreement under the health infrastructure.61 Here the 
                                                      
56 See the press release on 29-03-2020 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEX_19_1891 
57 The Commission launched four different calls for tender for medical equipment and supplies on 28 February 
2020 (gloves and surgical gowns), 17 March (personal protective equipment for eye and respiratory protection, 
as well as medical ventilators and respiratory equipment), and 19 March (laboratory equipment, including testing 
kits) - with participation of up to 25 Member States (https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-
eu/health/coronavirus-response/public-health_en). 
58 ‘DG Health - Health Security Committee, Summary 11th meeting on Outbreak of Coronavirusdisease 
(COVID-19) (13 March 2020)’. 
59 Council Decision of 24 June 2014 on the Arrangements for the Implementation by the Union of the Solidarity 
Clause (2014/415/EU) OJ L 192/53. 
60 Decision (EU) 2019/420 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2019 amending Decision 
No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (OJ L 77I , 20.3.2019, p. 1–15). 
61 Par 20. ibid. 
 
 
14
Commission can assume a more central role, because the Decision allows for central EU 
implementing decisions towards distribution and allocation. Nevertheless, the actual capacity 
of “rescEU” still largely depends on Member States’ willingness to contribute, and it is 
doubtful that for medical countermeasures EU internal funding will be comparable to what 
can be organized at the national level or through the JPA in the EU health context. 
 
All these are steps forward, but, simultaneously, one needs to be mindful of the very diverse 
realities of medicinal purchasing powers in the Member States, the absence of a EU budget in 
this regard and the highly intergovernmental nature of the process, which is inevitably very 
bureaucratic, difficult to manage and not generating the speed that an urgent procurement 
process would need. Furthermore, in a context such as the COVID-19 pandemic, difficult and 
delicate decisions will  have to be taken along the process: think about the order of priority in 
which Member States receive their part of the common stockpile of medical countermeasures, 
if the industry (e.g. the pharmaceutical industry in case of a new vaccine) cannot immediately 
answer a large-scale demand. The challenge of a process where the Member States have to 
decide on this among themselves would mandate a larger role for the European Commission, 
rather than the current structure where all contracting parties have to instantly agree on the 
deployment of medical counter measures in accordance to urgency and need, and rules that 
are sufficiently clear ex ante, with strong measures against any free-riding. 
 
2.3. EU role for health solidarity: export limitation of medicines and other crucial goods 
When it comes to medicines as one of the counter measures of central importance in 
combating COVID-19, in the Commission Communication that was published recently,62 the 
free movement of goods is mentioned as one of the instruments for coordinating Member 
States’ actions. Particularly, the Communication addresses the situation in which certain 
medical equipment and goods are scarce and need to be ‘channeled to those who need them 
most’.63 Thus, free movement and the integrity of the Single Market are now seen as 
necessary vehicles for true European solidarity. As a rule within internal market law, 
whenever a Member State creates a barrier to the free movements, this needs to be 
                                                      
62 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European Central Bank (March 13, 2020), the European Investment Bank and the Eurogroup, Coordinated 
economic response to the COVID-19 Outbreak, COM(2020) 112 final, Brussels. 
63 page 3.  
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communicated, so all other Member States can be informed.64 In the case of goods that are 
deemed essential for fighting COVID-19 the Commission has established a task force to 
ensure that these comments are mediated. One of the limitations to the use of the public health 
exception is already that these national restrictions cannot exist in rules that prevent national 
firms from responding to public procurement that is tendered at EU level.65  
As some Member States have started hoarding certain products or limiting their suppliers’ 
access to the European market, these measures can also interfere with the public health goal 
at the EU level of getting these supplies to those who need them most. This means that the 
Commission sees stockpiling or interrupting supply chains of vital importance to the whole 
of the EU as potentially prohibited export limitations. The EU in this regard in the 
Communication reiterates Article 35 TFEU. This article addresses national restrictions on 
exports. Legally, all the public health exceptions in the case law and in Article 36 TFEU 
simply apply. This means that if Member States for a solid public health reason want to 
restrict export, they have the authority to do so as long as it is done in a proportionate and 
non-discriminatory fashion. The principle of proportionality however that is outlined by the 
Commission is of a different nature:  
[The measures need to be] appropriate, necessary and proportionate to achieve such [health] objective, 
by ensuring an adequate supply to the persons who need the most while preventing any occurrence or 
aggravation of shortages of goods, considered as essential – such as individual protective equipment, 
medical devices or medicinal products – throughout the EU.  
 
Particularly this last iteration is a novel addition that is not based on case law or any other 
legal instrument. It assumes a concept of EU public health and EU solidarity, rather than the 
usual interpretation where public health is a policy area in which – even in the face of the 
strong economic and integrative forces of the internal market of the EU – domestic solidarity 
within Member States (and Member States’ sovereignty in this domain) is the principle that 
has to be traded-off against market integration.  
 
According to the European Commission, this means an outright export ban will not be 
deemed  proportionate; the measure needs to be aimed and ensuring that the products reach 
the persons who need them most, and it needs to suit the objective of the health of people who 
need them most. Clearly this is not the usual interpretation of Article 35 TFEU juncto Article 
                                                      
64 Decision No.1082/2013/EU, ‘Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
October 2013 on Serious Cross-Border Threats to Health and Repealing Decision No 2119/98/EC (O.J. L 293/1 
5-11-2013)’. 
65 See supra note 62. 
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36 TFEU, which was never intended to only serve public health at EU level. Rather, it was 
there for the creation of the internal market, despite national health laws. However, other 
measures that may create barriers to free movements, such as price regulation in Member 
States, as long as these are not discriminatory, are allowed according to the Commission. So 
too are other national measures to regulate the market of medical supplies. 
 
Importantly, the EU procurement of a pandemic medicine and other medical products can be 
severely undermined if Member States, in the face of COVID-19, disrupt supply chains. The 
process within the JPA is intergovernmental, and runs the risk of playing out in the context of 
actual export bans. Beyond the case of an EU-wide procurement arrangement, solidarity is 
also undermined by hoarding and limitations in the supply chain, let alone by the economic 
impact of such measures. However, even if the Commission would adopt a ‘EU health 
solidarity - based’ interpretation for scrutinizing whether national export bans fall under the 
public health exception to the free movement of goods, the question is whether at the current 
moment, the possibility of an infringement procedure from the European Commission would 
scare Member State politicians more than not having control over the stockpiles of particular 
goods. 
 
One manner in which the Commission’s proposal in the Communication is creating more 
political pressure in this regard is through the taskforce that involves the Member States for 
looking into national export limitations. Member States’ markets are highly integrated, hence 
in this intergovernmental taskforce the Commission might be able to leverage political power 
more than a mere infringement procedure might be able to do. At the same time, this situation 
also clearly calls for a pandemic budget and power at the EU level to ensure the distribution 
of medicines and urgently needed medicines for the whole of the Union. 
 
3. What would citizens want from EU health solidarity in the procurement of pandemic 
medicines? 
 
In exploring the role the EU could have for ensuring health solidarity when it comes to a 
pandemic emergency and the availability of countermeasures, it is also important to consider 
citizens’ preferences.  This is difficult, however, given the paucity of well-formulated survey 
questions and research designs – not least given the unfamiliarity among citizens with 
medical risk-pooling, and also the given the tendency of people to express opinions about 
health matters in socially desirable ways rather than expressing true thinking. 
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To shed at least some light on public support for the EU’s role in medical procurement, we 
conducted an original experiment as pilot to a larger survey project on attitudes towards EU 
fiscal and medical policies.  The pilot was administered in November 2019, just prior to the 
COVID-19 outbreak, and involved a broadly representative sample of 400 Dutch respondents, 
yielding a sample of 2400 policy packages judged by respondents.  Our survey explored 
support for risk pooling in the purchases and accessibility of pharmaceutical medicines 
relevant to major outbreaks.   
 
The experimental portion of the survey was a so-called conjoint experiment.  This involved 
asking respondents to judge pairings of policy packages that combined policy features on 
three dimensions of a hypothetical EU pooling of risk and purchases of pharmaceuticals.  The 
three dimensions and possible answers for any given policy package being judged were: (1) 
Do respondents prefer a programme for a limited range of medicines crucial to large-scale 
disease outbreaks or for all medicines where collective purchases can be financially 
beneficial? (Possible answers: a. limited and essential medicines; b. potentially all medicines); 
(2) Do respondents prefer a programme that lends access to the pooled medicines based on a 
country’s own contribution, or instead priority access based on needs to stanch epidemic 
spread? (Possible answers: a. access based on a country’s contribution; b. access based on 
prioritizing countries to prevent spread); and (3) Do respondents prefer a programme that is 
administered by EU-level experts or instead national-level experts? (Possible answers: a. 
national-level experts; b. EU-level experts).  In the conjoint experiment, respondents do not 
issue a judgment about the individual dimensions. Instead they are asked to judge entire 
packages exhibiting a given combination of policy features of those dimensions. In particular, 
respondents choose among and rate randomly assigned alternative packages that combine a 
random combination of policy features (from each of the three policy dimensions one answer 
from the set of possible answers to that dimension). This experimental approach evokes more 
honest answers from respondents even with respect to socially undesirable answers.   
 
What this experimental study has revealed is preliminary evidence, being based on a limited 
sample in a given country and a particular period of time just prior to the corona virus 
outbreak. But what it reveals about public support for EU medical procurement is important.  
We shall focus on two basic patterns in the answers that Dutch respondents gave.  First, there 
is a plurality of support for as opposed to opposition to such EU pharmaceutical sharing. This 
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is clear in Figure 1 below, where the combination of somewhat and strongly support given to 
any given package garners almost 44 per cent of the Dutch sample, while ‘only’ 23 percent is 
opposed (32 percent is indifferent).  These patterns are not significantly different across basic 
demographic sub-groups (younger versus older respondents; more or less educated 
respondents; men versus women). This is a sign, however tentative, that EU-level 
procurement would command substantial support among the Dutch population.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: 
Percent of Dutch Respondents Supporting EU medicine-procurement sharing 
 
 
Second, and perhaps more interestingly, the Dutch respondents express preferences for a 
particular kind of EU procurement programme with respect to the three dimensions of 
procurement policy that we showed respondents.  These preferences are summarized in the 
Figure 2 below, showing the predicted preference of respondents for a given value on a given 
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dimension – based on an experimental inference of choice for a given package exhibiting the 
randomly assigned policy features per dimension.  The dots capture the mean prediction, 
while the dark lines on either side of those means depict the range or interval of predicted 
values within 95% confidence. Where both the mean and the confidence interval are in their 
entirety to the right of the vertical line, we have 95% confidence that respondents are more 
likely (and when to the left of the vertical line that respondents are less likely) to choose an 
EU-procurement policy package that has this particular feature.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 
Predicted Preference for Policy Features of EU medicine-procurement sharing 
  
 
Figure 2 shows clear patterns in what kind of procurement policy Dutch respondents 
preferred. The Dutch sample population is indifferent as to whether EU-level or national 
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experts and agencies administer such programmes: Focusing on the third dimension on ‘WHO 
ADMINISTERS?’, respondents are very weakly less likely to prefer national-level 
administration than EU-level administration (the baseline), but this is clearly not a statistically 
meaningful difference (note that a substantial part of the confidence interval crosses the 
vertical line).  On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that the Dutch respondents clearly do tend 
to prefer an EU programme that covers a broader swath of medicines, potentially all 
medicines: focusing on the first dimension ‘FOR WHICH MEDICINES?’ we see that 
respondents are about 15% more likely to choose an EU procurement policy that includes 
such coverage over a policy that focuses only on a narrow set of medicines (the baseline).  
Finally, Figure 2 also shows that the respondents are even more likely to prefer an EU 
procurement policy that gives priority access to particular countries to prevent contagion: 
focusing on the second dimension ‘PRIORITY ACCESS’, we see that respondents are about 
23% more likely to choose EU-procurement policy that gives priority access to countries 
where a contagion can be traced, to simply providing access to medicines based on a 
country’s actual contributions, without looking at such a priority in need (the baseline). 
 
Obviously, because the survey was only conducted among a limited number of respondents 
from one country at one specific moment, one should not overinterpret the outcomes. It is also 
well-known that the framing of a survey experiment can have a substantial effect on the 
outcomes. Moreover, the current experiment took place at a moment when the described 
frame was still hypothetical and before any public debate about centralization of policies in 
response to infectious diseases has taken place. In the midst of the current corona virus crisis 
respondents’ answers would likely be shaped by the crisis experience so far.  Given that the 
shortcomings of the current decentralized policies have become so obvious, it is not at all 
clear that support for more centralized policies will have fallen.  Hence, we interpret our pilot 
experiment’s results as providing qualified but significant support for the view that there is 
meaningful political traction for EU-level pooling of procurement capacity in the Dutch 
sample. 
 
4. Policy suggestions for an effective way forward 
For a long time, the organization of solidarity or health concerns were seen as potential 
arguments to set limits on the Single Market principles that guide European integration, and 
even to organize a degree of ‘protectionism’ – against the thrust of EU integration. Drawing 
and re-drawing the thin line between ‘national solidarity’ and ‘national health’ demands, on 
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one hand, and the principles of market integration and free movement, on the other hand, has 
been the subject of much CJEU activity and case law. We have now entered into a debate that 
is, in a sense, opposite: now, the European Commission considers restrictions to the free 
movement of goods as in breach of European solidarity and European public health. In yet 
other words, we are witnessing a clash between claims of ‘national prerogatives’ in the 
domain of solidarity and public health, and a true ‘pan-European approach’. 
 
Across EU countries, there are large differences in health care systems. Systems differ not 
only in terms of the quality of the care and the available budgets, but also in terms of history, 
culture and organization. There are valid reasons to respect the ‘subsidiarity principle’ in 
health care matters, as deviations from this principle carry a danger of major inefficiencies or 
exacerbate inequalities: a central decision that ignores differences in national health 
arrangements could have widely varying impacts on Member States’ healthcare systems. The 
issue is different, however, when it comes to decisions related to infectious diseases, because 
such decisions may have large cross-border spillovers. In this case, ‘national prerogatives’ 
may create a problem of collective action that yields, in the end, bad outcomes for everyone. 
  
If the line of argument is accepted that claims based on ‘national prerogatives’ now have to 
give way to true European solidarity, then the European Union must prove that it can also 
support the Member States in a tangible way at the EU level. Therefore, the Joint 
Procurement initiative both within the EU health regime (which can ensure size and volume) 
and the “rescEU” (which creates a central allocation authority for the European Commission) 
are so important. However, the two elements, volume and central authority, do not coincide.  
It does not suffice for Member States to say that the EU can only have the role of steering 
them to respect the integrity of the Single Market and allow for unfettered free movement. 
The EU will then also need to be empowered to set up real cooperation so that, in the end, it 
can keep citizens more safe. In yet other words: EU action today cannot only be ‘negative’ 
(‘Don’t block your borders!’), it must also be ‘positive’ (together, we organize a cooperative 
effort). 
 
However, the policy legacy since the Swine Flu epidemic shows that national policy-makers 
prefer a domestic-centered equilibrium, whereby the reluctance to follow internal market 
principles is coupled with an equal reluctance on the part of the Member States’ politicians to 
pool the procurement of medicines as it would potentially transfer redistributive power to the 
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EU level.66 Our research into EU solidarity strongly suggests that such reluctance may be 
misguided. Not only a possible better equilibrium exists, whereby the internal market is 
protected by EU-level solidarity provisions; but also considerable political support for it can 
be found in the public opinion. A poll among Dutch respondents suggests that a majority of 
the Dutch are prepared to pool medicine procurement and share risks at the EU level. This 
may be seen as quite remarkable as the Dutch are among the most skeptical when it comes to 
European-level economic stabilization arrangements.67 Hence, it is highly plausible that EU 
citizens are more willing than their leaders to accept solidarity arrangements when these are 
only there for emergencies. 
 
Europe is now paying the price for a lack of a centralized policy in the face of pan-European 
health threats. Countries are competing with each other to acquire these products, for example 
by imposing export bans. The result is a decentralized outcome that is suboptimal in the sense 
of these products not always being allocated where they are most needed. However, in the 
current circumstances legal threats from infringements of the internal market rules likely have 
little effect. In short, the current corona virus crisis shows the catastrophic costs of a lack of 
central policy for infectious diseases. With export bans and other measures, each country tries 
to secure as many resources as possible for itself. And this is hastening a tragedy of the 
European health care commons. 
 
So what needs to be done? The EU urgently needs to develop and use a well-embedded and 
efficient central capacity for a truly centralized EU procurement of medical counter-measures 
as is outlined in “rescEU”, without the inefficiencies that are currently there as a result of the 
current intergovernmental and voluntary nature of the process under the health regime and the 
legally embedded possibilities for unsolidary behavior.68 Central procurement is needed for 
                                                      
66 See WHO Regional Office for Europe, “Challenges and opportunities in improving access to medicines 
through efficient public procurement in the WHO European Region (2010)”; see further documents on risk 
pooling and solidarity in health https://www.who.int/health_financing/documents/pooling/en/ and see in a 
similar vein Jaime Espin and others, ‘WHO-Europe Policy Brief, How Can Voluntary Cross-Border 
Collaboration in Public Procurement Improve Access to Health Technologies in Europe?’ 
67 For a sceptical view, though expressed in a personal capacity, by Dutch (senior) civil servants, see Heijdra, 
M., Aarden, T., Hanson, J. and T. van Dijk (2018, November 30), A more stable EMU does not require a central 
fiscal capacity, VoxEU. 
68 Costa-Font, J. (2020), Europe’s failure to address Covid-19 shows the need for a European ‘health 
citizenship’, argues in favour of a European ‘health citizenship’, https://www.socialeurope.eu/europes-failure-to-
address-covid-19-shows-the-need-for-a-european-health-citizenship . His arguments are mainly based on the fact 
that European governments adopt widely differing policy responses to the Covid-19 crisis, which is hard to 
motivate as an optimal solution. 
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protective devices, and will certainly be needed for the vaccine against the COVID-19 virus 
as soon as it becomes available. It will also be needed for future infectious diseases. Funding 
of the capacity can come from the EU budget or by levying a separate contribution from the 
Member States, say in proportion to their GDP, their population and their demography. The 
demography is relevant, because countries with an elderly population will on average need to 
make more use of medicines. It cannot be excluded that the proposed centralization of 
policies has elements of redistribution, for example when contributions are linked to GDP. 
However, there relative limited redistributive effects should be weighed against the benefits 
of the centralization. 
 
What are these benefits? First, an advantage of centralizing procurement is that it will be more 
difficult for pharmaceutical companies to play off Member States against each other by 
threatening not to supply to an individual Member State if it tries to negotiate lower prices.  
Secondly, the advantage of having a common stockpile of medical counter-measures managed 
at the EU level is that excess demand in some countries and excess supply in other countries, 
an obvious economic inefficiency, can no longer co-exist. Thirdly, and most importantly, 
because the stockpile is common and, hence, larger than any potential national stockpile, there 
is much greater firepower to target outbreaks of infectious diseases wherever and as soon they 
emerge. In other words, risk sharing against the consequences of pandemics becomes much 
more effective than when each country is responsible for its own stock of medicines and 
equipment. 
 
Finally, the decision where to target the firepower should be taken at the central level. This 
avoids that each country tries to deviate from the cooperative solution by securing as much of 
the medicine supply as possible at the cost of other countries. Breaking away from the 
cooperative solution would likely be self-defeating, because it reduces the chances to quell a 
disease outbreak where it starts. However, political decision makers may not be able to see 
this or may be under political pressure to secure the safety of their own population first. 
 
In other words, once a disease outbreak has started, cooperative agreements are not credible.69 
Ideally, the EU sets up arrangements ex ante that are ex post credible. Obviously, Europe has 
missed the ‘ex ante’ of this crisis. However, a crisis may also be a moment to get to solutions 
                                                      
69 A cooperative agreement in this context is to be understood as an agreement among decentralized decision 
makers, which is to be distinguished from the case of a single decision maker at the EU level.  
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that are unthinkable in normal times ‘Crises which hit the consumer are excellent ways of 
speeding up policies.’70. We have seen that during the European debt crisis when crisis 
arrangements like the ESM were set up. Our proposal of the centralization of procurement, 
stockpiling and deployment decisions of medical countermeasures to infectious diseases is ex-
post credible, provided the design is right. This requires centrally-controlled guidance on the 
use of medicines based on the pooled expertise and instructions of the European Medicines 
Agency and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Such guidance will be 
easier when it is laid down in advance, before an infectious disease emerges. New diseases 
will obviously have unknown features. However, the optimal response to an infectious disease 
in its very first stages is likely to always be very similar, namely the concentration of 
substantial resources targeted at the first victims and containment within direct environment. 
The optimal response to a crisis that is already in full swing, like the current one, is more 
difficult to define. In particular, once a vaccine for Covid-19 becomes available, it would be 
to the experts to determine the best allocation of the vaccines given the availability and the 
objective, for example the minimization of lost years of life or number of casualties. Ethical 
considerations will inevitably play an important role for in determining the relevant objective. 
However, these are the domain of the politicians rather than the experts. 
 
Risk-sharing arrangements dealing with disease outbreaks can even be taken a step further. It 
is obvious that the cost of drastic measures like a lockdown of a local economy are mostly 
borne at the level of that economy, while the benefits in terms of containing a disease are 
enjoyed by the entire EU. The uneven cost-benefit trade-off at the local or national level may 
make the authorities at those levels reluctant to take drastic measures. Having a central 
capacity that can compensate for the financial consequences of such measures will help to 
equalize the return” to such measures to their broader EU return. 
 
No doubt there will be hesitations and obstacles in place – despite the lessons learned from 
the Swine Flu epidemic and the tragic lessons from the Covid-19 crisis – towards centralizing 
policies for medical countermeasures to infectious diseases. One such hesitation could be the 
democratic basis of centralized EU decision making in making distributive choices with 
regard to medicines. However, at Member State level it is likely that such distributive choices 
– which require difficult scientific and ethical choices – are also a matter for the executive. 
                                                      
70 Ruijter (n 7) 114. 
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The national parliament has the possibility to hold the executive to account after the choice 
has already be made, given the speed of decision making that the pandemic might require. 
When it comes to centralizing policies in response to infectious diseases, there is 
accountability to the national parliaments for the delegation decision and to the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments for the specific design of the policy. When it comes 
to the actual execution of the policy in the face of an urgency, accountability to the European 
Parliament can only be exerted ex post. The situation may be seen as analogous to Eurozone 
monetary policy, in which decisions are made by “technocratic experts”, while the President 
of the ECB appears regularly for hearings in the European Parliament. 
 
 
